<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Dpapi on kanyo's blog</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/tags/dpapi/</link><description>Recent content in Dpapi on kanyo's blog</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://chaelsoo.me/tags/dpapi/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HTB: Voleur</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-voleur/</link><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-voleur/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Windows AD box where NTLM authentication is completely disabled. That single constraint changes everything about how you operate: no pass-the-hash, no NTLM relay, every tool needs a TGT and Kerberos must be properly configured. The box hands you starting credentials upfront but then makes you earn the rest through a chain that&amp;rsquo;s worth understanding. A spreadsheet locked in an SMB share leaks passwords for accounts you can&amp;rsquo;t use yet. A service account with WriteSPN lets you kerberoast your way to WinRM. A group called Restore_Users hints at a deleted employee. And once you bring that employee back from tombstone, his archived DPAPI blobs hand you the next account&amp;rsquo;s credentials without any cracking at all.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>