<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Krbrelay on kanyo's blog</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/tags/krbrelay/</link><description>Recent content in Krbrelay on kanyo's blog</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://chaelsoo.me/tags/krbrelay/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HTB: VulnCicada</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-vulncicada/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-vulncicada/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This one genuinely surprised me at almost every step. The entry was a photo on an NFS share with a password on a sticky note, an Easy-box trick on what turns out to be a Medium machine. Then the environment punches back: NTLM is disabled domain-wide, so every standard relay tool, every classic pass-the-hash shortcut, just bounces. The ADCS scan comes back with ESC8, web enrollment over HTTP. Normally that&amp;rsquo;s an NTLM relay to certsrv. Without NTLM it looks dead. But &amp;ldquo;NTLM is disabled&amp;rdquo; doesn&amp;rsquo;t mean relay attacks are impossible. It means you have to do it with Kerberos instead, which is a completely different mechanism that&amp;rsquo;s conceptually harder to grasp. You control the DNS name, so you control the SPN the DC requests a ticket for, so you can be the legitimate endpoint that ticket was meant for and turn around and use it at certsrv. I didn&amp;rsquo;t know this was even a thing before this box. Tons of learning, exactly what a good Medium should feel like.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>