<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Laps on kanyo's blog</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/tags/laps/</link><description>Recent content in Laps on kanyo's blog</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://chaelsoo.me/tags/laps/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HTB: StreamIO</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-streamio/</link><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-streamio/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Windows AD box with a PHP streaming site on HTTPS. The attack chain is unusually web-heavy for an HTB Active Directory box: you spend more time in Burp than in evil-winrm before the domain even becomes relevant. The interesting part isn&amp;rsquo;t any single vulnerability. It&amp;rsquo;s how a SQL injection on one subdomain eventually feeds into an eval() backdoor on another, and how Firefox&amp;rsquo;s credential store hands over an AD account with a path nobody mentions until you look at it in BloodHound.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>HTB: Timelapse</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-timelapse/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-timelapse/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Windows box, no credentials. The initial foothold is unusual: instead of extracting a password from some file, you crack a PFX certificate and use it directly to authenticate to WinRM. No username, no password, just a client certificate. It&amp;rsquo;s a reminder that Windows supports certificate-based authentication in places people often forget about. LAPS is the escalation, which is worth understanding because it&amp;rsquo;s deployed everywhere and constantly misread on BloodHound graphs.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>