<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Nxc on kanyo's blog</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/tags/nxc/</link><description>Recent content in Nxc on kanyo's blog</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-gb</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://chaelsoo.me/tags/nxc/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HTB: Cicada</title><link>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-cicada/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://chaelsoo.me/writeups/htb-cicada/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Windows box, no web server. Everything comes from SMB and LDAP, one credential leading to the next. It&amp;rsquo;s a nice example of how a single operational security mistake, a default password in an HR notice, a cleartext password in an AD description, credentials embedded in a script, cascades into domain compromise. The escalation at the end via Backup Operators and SeBackupPrivilege is a classic that deserves proper understanding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="recon"&gt;Recon&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;10.129.231.149, domain &lt;code&gt;cicada.htb&lt;/code&gt;, DC hostname &lt;code&gt;CICADA-DC&lt;/code&gt;. Windows Server 2022. Standard AD ports, WinRM on 5985, no MSSQL this time. Anonymous SMB auth was denied, but the guest account worked:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>